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CHILDREN'S WAIVER OF MIRANDA RIGHTS AND
THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISIONS IN
PARHAM, BELLOTTI, AND FARE
LESLIE J. HARRIS*

A variety of laws deny a child the freedom of action which adults
typically enjoy by requiring him to act in accordance with his
parents' wishes. Some laws deny effect to his actions unless his
parent consents to or joins in the action. For example, a child alone
usually may not marry' or make a contract,' or, in some states, sue
or be sued. 3 Other laws impose on a child the duty to obey his
parents. If he resists, the juvenile court will order him to obey their
reasonable or lawful commands."
*Associate Professor of Law, University of Utah College of Law; B.A., New Mexico State
University, 1973; J.D., University of New Mexico School of Law, 1976. Research for this
paper was supported by a grant from the Utah College of Law. The author wishes to thank
Dean Walter E. Oberer for making this grant possible. She also thanks him and her colleagues,
John J. Flynn, Lionel H. Frankel, and William J. Lockhart for reading and commenting on
drafts of this article. The article also owes much to the research assistance of John Rich,
second-year student at the University of Utah College of Law.
1. See Clark, Law of Domestic Relations § 2.9 (1968). In most jurisdictions, a child between
certain ages may marry only with parental consent. Below that age a child may not marry at all.
See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-2 (Repl. 1969), § 30-1-9 (Supp. 1979). An attempted "marriage" without consent will be void or voidable, depending on the statute.
2. See Calamari & Perillo, The Law of Contracts §§ 8-2, 8-3 (2d ed. 1977). In most jurisdictions, a minor may avoid a contract into which he enters alone. A few jurisdictions also permit
his parents to disaffirm the contract. Further, adults frequently refuse to contract with a minor
because he is incapable of giving legal assurance that he will not disaffirm.
3. See James & Hazard, Civil Procedure § 9.9 (1977). In some states a minor may sue or be
sued in his own name, but the litigation should be managed by a guardian or next friend, who
sues in that capacity. In other states the guardian is treated as the minor's legal representative
and should be sued in his own name as guardian.
4. See, e.g., D. C. Code § 16-2301(8) (1973); N.Y. Fain. Ct. Act § 712(b) (McKinney Supp.
1979); N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 32-1-3(M), -9 (1978). The constitutionality of such statutes has
generally been upheld against due process void-for-vagueness attacks. See, e.g., State v. Mattielo, 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 55, 225 A.2d 507 (1966); District of Columbia v. B.J.R., 332 A.2d 58
(D.C.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1016 (1975); In re L.N., 109 N.J. Super. 278, 263 A.2d 150,
aff'd, 57 N.J. 165, 270 A.2d 409 (1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 1009 (1971); In re Napier, 532
P.2d 423 (Okla. 1975). Cf. Gesicki v. Oswald, 336 F. Supp. 371, aff'd, 406 U.S. 913 (1972)
(statute which permitted children deemed "wayward" to be sentenced to correctional institutions held unconstitutional). See also Katz & Teitelbaum, PINS Jurisdiction, The Vagueness
Doctrine, and the Rule of Law, in Beyond Control: Status Offenders in Juvenile Court 201
(Teitelbaum & Gough eds. 1977).
The validity of using the state's authority to force children to obey their. parents has recently
been attacked on principle and for practical reasons. The recently published IJA-ABA Juvenile
Justice Standards Project, Standards Relating to Noncriminal Misbehavior (Tent. Draft 1977)
[hereinafter cited as IJA-ABA Standards-Noncriminal Misbehavior] calls for abolition of this
ground for asserting juvenile court jurisdiction. IJA-ABA Standards-Noncriminal
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In three cases' decided by the Supreme Court in the summer of
1979 children challenged state statutes that gave their parents power
to make decisions that seriously limited the children's freedom. The
statutes challenged in Parham v. J.R. 6 and Secretary of Public
Welfare v. InstitutionalizedJuveniles' delegated to parents8 power
to decide whether their children should be institutionalized in a mental hospital, subject only to approval of hospital authorities.
(Hereinafter both cases will be referred to as Parham.9 ) The statute
reviewed in Bellotti v. Baird ° required a pregnant minor to seek
parental approval before she could have an abortion, though it permitted her to petition a court for consent if her parents refused.
Misbehavior, Std L.L The proposal has been vehemently opposed, even by members of the
IJA-ABA Joint Commission on Juvenile Justice Standards itself. See id. at 67, for dissenting
view of Commissioner Justine Wise Polier. The other recent major set of proposed standards
for juvenile courts, the National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and
Goals, Report of the Task Force on Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (1976)
[hereinafter Task Force Report] rejects arguments to abolish juvenile court jurisdiction over
this kind of juvenile misconduct altogether. It proposes instead that juvenile courts take
jurisdiction over this kind of problem under the rubric of "Families With Service Needs."
Task Force Report, supra,at ch. 10 ("Families With Service Needs: Jurisdiction and Scope of
Authority"). The states have developed various schemes for ameliorating the harsh treatment
of status offenders while still retaining juvenile court jurisdiction over them. See Utah Code
Ann. § 78-3a-16.5 (Repl. 1977) (juvenile court has jurisdiction over a child alleged to be
beyond control or a runaway only after the division of family services determines that despite
"earnest and persistent efforts" the problem cannot be resolved extrajudicially). See also
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 5633(a)(12) (Supp.
1976) (states receiving funds under the Act must deinstitutionalize status offenders).
Even those commentators who argue against juvenile court jurisdiction over status offenders
do not deny that parents have authority to regulate their children's lives. See IJA-ABA Standards-Noncriminal Misbehavior, supra, at Introduction.
5. Parham v. J.R., 99 S. Ct. 2493 (1979); Secretary of Pub. Welfare v. Institutionalized
Juveniles, 99 S. Ct. 2523 (1979); Bellotti v. Baird, 99 S. Ct. 3035 (1979).
6. 99 S. Ct. 2493 (1979).
7. 99 S. Ct. 2523 (1979).
8. "Parent" is used as shorthand for "parent, legal guardian, or custodian" unless otherwise indicated.
9. This shorthand reference is adopted for the sake of convenience. The holdings of the two
cases, for the purposes of this paper, may be considered together.
10. 99 S. Ct. 3035 (1979). Actually this was the Court's second opinion in Bellotti. For convenience, the opinion will be referred to in the text simply as Bellolti. In the first opinion,
Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976) (Bellotti I), the Court vacated the judgment of a threejudge district court that had held Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 112, § 12(S) (1974) unconstitutional. The Court held that the district court should have abstained from deciding the case until
the Massachusetts state courts had an opportunity to construe the statute in a way that "would
avoid or substantially modify the federal constitutional challenge" to it. 428 U.S. at 148. On
remand the district court certified nine questions to the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts which were answered in Baird v. Attorney General, 371 Mass. 741, 360 N.E.2d
288 (Mass. 1977). The original plaintiffs in Bellotti again challenged the constitutionality of
§ 125 as construed, and the district court again held it unconstitutional and enjoined its enforcement. Baird v. Bellotti, 428 F. Supp. 854 (D. Mass. 1977). Bellotti, Attorney General of
Massachusetts, then successfully sought review in the Supreme Court. In Bellotti v. Baird, 99
S. Ct. 3035 (1979) (Bellotti II), the Court affirmed the district court's opinion invalidating the
statute and enjoining its enforcement.
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In each case the Court approved the statutes' initial delegations of
decision-making power to parents because the statutes furthered two
substantial goals: protecting parents' rights to raise their children
and protecting children from the consequences of their own immature judgment." In each case the Court said that the Constitution
required only limited procedural safeguards against abuse of parental power. '2
Within a few weeks of the Parhamand Bellotti decisions the Court
decided a fourth case in which a child's legal capacity to make a
significant decision alone was also at issue. In Fare v. Michael C.'3
the state argued that a 16-year-old boy's waiver of his Miranda"'
rights prior to custodial police interrogation was valid, even though
his request to see his trusted probation officer first had been denied.
The boy, Michael, argued that his request constituted an assertion of
his right to remain silent. He claimed, therefore, that his murder
conviction in juvenile court, based substantially on his confession,
could not stand. The Supreme Court held that Michael had not
asserted his right to remain silent" and further found his waiver

valid. 16
Unlike the opinions in Parhamand Bellotti, the Fareopinion did
not discuss the right of parents to participate in their child's decision
making process. Nor did it show similar concern for protecting a
child from the consequences of an unsound decision. Indeed, the
Fareopinion did not refer to either Parhamor Bellotti.
These cases share common central issues, yet in them the Supreme
Court approached and resolved these issues in very different ways.
The first part of this article will review the Parham-Bellottiapproach
and its constitutional underpinnings. The second part will compare
this approach to the Court's analysis in Fareand will argue that the
Fare analysis does not adequately protect the interests of parents and
children. The article will conclude with a suggested explanation of
the Court's inconsistent analyses of the effect of minority on legal
capacity to make decisions.

11. Parham v. J.R., 99S. Ct. at 2504-05; Bellotti v. Baird, 99 S. Ct. at 3046-51.
12. Parham v. J. R., 99 S. Ct. at 2503-07; Bellotti v. Baird, 99 S. Ct. at 3048-51.
13. 99S. Ct. 2560(1979).
14. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The Court held that before a confession given
during police custodial interrogation can be admitted at trial, the police must warn the accused
(1) that he has the right to remain silent; (2) that anything he says can be used against him; (3)
that he has the right to a lawyer; and (4) that a lawyer will be provided to him free if he cannot
afford to hire one. For a more extensive discussion of Miranda, see text accompanying notes
75-95 infra.
15. 99S. Ct. at 2571.
16. 99S. Ct. at 2572-73.
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DEVELOPMENT OF AND POLICIES BEHIND THE RIGHT OF
PARENTS TO MAKE DECISIONS FOR THEIR CHILDREN
Three reasons are typically given for requiring a child to act in accordance with his parents' wishes. Because a child is inexperienced,
he is vulnerable to overreaching by unscrupulous adults. Because of
his immaturity, he may make unsound decisions with long-term
deleterious effects. An adult interested in the child's welfare who intercedes to advise him and, if necessary, to veto his decisions, may in
either case save him from the harsh consequences of his own illadvised actions. Finally, parents have an independent right to rear
their child as they see fit, at least so long as they do not harm him.
The Supreme Court, in a series of cases beginning in 1923, has
established that a parent's claim to direct his child's life is protected
by the due process clause." At various times the Court has adopted
each of these reasons to explain why the Constitution protects this
claim.
Until 19768 all of the Court's decisions in this area addressed conflicts between the state and parents or persons asserting the rights of
parents' 9 about how children should be raised. As might be expected, the emphasis in these cases is on the parents' right. The
earliest cases-Meyer v. Nebraska,2" decided in 1923, and Pierce v.
Society of Sisters,2 decided in 1925-simply assert that parents have
a constitutionally-protected right to "direct the upbringing and
education of children under their control." 2 In both cases, the
Court held state statutes unconstitutional because they arbitrarily23
infringed on this right. In neither case, however, did the Court explain why due process protects a parent's claim to raise his children
without undue governmental interference."'
17. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 515 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
18. In Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976), the Court first
decided a case presenting a conflict between parent and child over decision making authority.
See also Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
19. For example, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), and in Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), teachers or schools, rather than parents, challenged the
statutes. The Court permitted them to assert the interests of parents in raising their children, as
well as their own interests.
20. 262 U.S. 390(1923).
21. 268 U.S. 510(1925).
22. Id. at 534-35. See also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. at 399, 403.
23. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. at 403; Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. at 535-36.
24. In both Meyer and Pierce the Court equated a parent's right to rear his children with his
duty to "prepare him for additional obligations." Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535; Meyer, 262 U.S. at
400. However, -neither opinion discusses why the duty of sociajizing children falls on their
parents nor why a parent requires legal protection for his authority over the child to discharge
this obligation. See also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) in which the Court held
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In subsequent cases the Court reaffirmed that this right is constitutionally protected,25 but it still did not clearly define what and
whose interests the right protects. The Court's opinion in Moore v.
City of East Cleveland26 suggests that protecting parents' rights to
rear their children furthers society's interest in socialization of those
children. 27 This rationale alone does not explain why parents, rather
than others, may guide a child's development.
In Smith v. Organizationof Foster Families28 the Court suggested
another and perhaps more satisfying rationale for the right. The
Court said that raising a child fulfills at least two parental needs:
[T]he importance of the familial relationship to the individuals
involved and to the society stems from the emotional attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily association,
and from the role one plays in "promot[ing] a way of life"
through instruction of children, Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205, 231-233 (1972) .... 29
The constitutional right of parents to control their minor
children's lives established in the Meyer-Pierce line of cases is not,
unconstitutional criminal convictions of Amish parents for violating a compulsory school
attendance law. The state's interest in requiring school attendance past the eighth grade was
not sufficiently great, the Court said, to justify the intrusion on the parents' fundamental first
amendment right to free exercise of religion and their traditional interest in directing the
religious upbringing of their children. The decision is not clearly based on parental child rearing rights because the parents and the Court relied heavily on the first amendment claim.
However, the opinion does invoke Pierceto support the right of parents to guide "the religious
future and education of their children." Yoder, 406 U.S. at 232. Again, however, the Court
does not explain the reason for giving constitutional protection to this right.
For commentators' discussions of why a parent has an independent right to control his
children, see, e.g., Dobson, The Juvenile Court and ParentalRights, 4 Fam. L.Q. 393 (1970);
Goldstein, Medical Carefor the Child at Risk: On State Supervision of ParentalAutonomy, 86
Yale L.J. 645 (1977); Hafen, Children's Liberation and the New Egalitarianism:Some Reservations About Abandoning Youth to Their "Rights," 3 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 605 (1976); Kleinfeld,
The Balance of PowerAmong Infants, Their Parents, and the State, 4 Fam. L.Q. 320 (1970);
Teitelbaum & Ellis, The Liberty Interest of Children:Due Process Rights and Their Application, 12 Fam. L.Q. 153, 160-73 (1978); Comment, The Mental Hospitalizationof Children and
the Limits of ParentalAuthority, 88 Yale L.J. 186, 194-209 (1978). See also Teitelbaum & Harris, Some Historical Perspectives on Governmental Regulation of Children and Parents, in
Beyond Control, supranote 4, at I.
25. See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (zoning ordinance denying grandmother right to live with her two young grandsons because they were cousins, not
brothers, unconstitutional); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (statute denying unwed
father the right to resist adoption of his children unconstitutional). But cf.Quilloin v. Walcott,
434 U.S. 246 (1978) (statute denying unwed father the right to resist adoption of his child held
unconstitutional because to so hold in this case was in the best interests of the child).
26. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
27. The Court said, "It is through the family that we inculcate and pass down many of our
most cherished values, moral and cultural." Id. at 503-04.
28. 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
29. Id. at 844.
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however, unlimited. The Supreme Court has also held that states
may constitutionally forbid child rearing practices that endanger
children. The Court first enunciated this principle in 1944 in Prince
v. Massachusetts,10 in which it upheld a state statute against a legal
custodian's" claim that it unconstitutionally infringed on her right
to inculcate religious values in her ward. The petitioner, a Jehovah's
Witness, was convicted of violating the state's child labor laws by
permitting the child to distribute religious magazines and preach in
public. The Court recognized that she had a constitutionally-protected right to direct the child's religious upbringing but still upheld
her conviction.
Children, the Court said, also have interests which must be considered: the rights to be "safeguarded from abuse and given opportunities for growth into free and independent well-developed men
and citizens." 2 State statutes designed to protect these rights of
children may be constitutional, even when they limit a parent's right
to raise his children as he sees fit."
The child's wishes in Prince were unclear, but the Court suggested
that even if they had coincided with those of Mrs. Prince the child
labor law could still have been applied to prevent her from pamphleteering and preaching.
Parents may be free to become martyrs themselves. But it does
not follow that they are free, in identical circumstances, to make
martyrs of their children before they have reachedthe age offull
discretion when they can make that choice for themand legal
4
selves.'

Prince establishes that state statutes may limit parental power to
control children when necessary to protect the children from harm,
includifig pressures on them to act contrarily to their own best
interests.
30. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
31. Id.at 161. See note 8supra.

32. Id.at 165.
33. See also Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (upholding a statute forbidding
children less than 17 to see sex material that was not "pornographic" in the constitutional
sense).
The well-being of its children is of course a subject within the State's constitutional power to regulate .... First of all, constitutional interpretation has consistently recognized that the parents' claim to authority in their own household
to direct the rearing of their children is basic in the structure of our society
.... The legislature could properly conclude that parents and others, teachers
for example, who have this primary responsibility for children's well-being are
entitled to the support of laws designed to aid discharge of that responsibility.
Id. at 639. See also F.C.C. v. Pacifica Foundation, 98 S.Ct. 3026, 3040 (1978); Erznoznik v.
City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205,212-14 (1975).
34. 321 U.S. at 170 (emphasis added).

Summer 19801

CHILDREN'S WAIVER OF MIRANDA RIGHTS

In Parham and Bellotti the Court turned the Prince limitation
around and used it, along with the general principle of constitutional
protection for parents' rights, to uphold state statutes giving parents
broad power to limit their children's freedom. Parham and Bellotti
are the first cases in which the Court explored in depth a direct conflict between parent and child over control of the child's life. The
Court in 1977 in Carey v. Population Services International" and in
1976 in PlannedParenthoodof Central Missouri v. Danforth6 had
held unconstitutional state statutes permitting children to buy contraceptives or to have abortions only if their parents consented.
These limitations were stricken, along with several other restrictions
aimed at adults, on the ground that they unconstitutionally interfered with an individual's right to decide whether to have children.
Neither opinion discussed in much detail the state's role in a parentchild conflict over what choice a child should make.3" In Parham
and Bellotti the Court did confront this question and discussed it in
some detail. A review of the facts, claims, and holdings in each case
helps make the Court's approach to the conflict clear. In each case
the Court analyzed the competing interests of the parent, the child,
and the state and struck a balance among them.
Parham v. J.R.
In Parham children challenged Georgia state statutes that permitted a parent to seek "voluntary admission" of his child to a state
mental hospital by signing an application for hospitalization. This
application authorized the superintendent of the hospital to hold the
child for "observation and diagnosis." If the superintendent found
"evidence of mental illness" and that the child was "suitable for
treatment," the child was admitted to the hospital for an indefinite
period of time. The statute required periodic medical reviews to
determine if the child continued to need hospitalization.3 8 The
35. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
36. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
37. But see concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Powell in Carey, 431 U.S. at 703; concurring
opinion of Mr. Justice Stevens, 431 U.S. at 712.
38. These are the procedures provided by the Georgia statute reviewed in Parham. See 99 S.
Ct. at 2498. The Pennsylvania statute reviewed in Secretary of Pub. Welfare v. Institutionalized Juveniles, 99 S. Ct. 2523 (1979) provided that a child less than 14 years old might be admitted to a mental health facility on application of his parent if the director of the facility
determined that the child was "in need of care or observation." Regulations promulgated
under the statute provided that only a pediatrician, general physician or psychologist might
refer a mentally retarded juvenile to a facility, that the referral had to be accompanied by a
psychiatric or psychological evaluation and specific reasons for recommending institutional
-are, and that the director of a facility had to discharge the child if he disagreed with the report
of the doctor or psychologist making the referral. The regulations provided additional
safeguards for a child after his admission, including a requirement that a child 13 years or older
who objected to remaining in an institution be released unless an involuntary commitment proceeding against him was initiated. 99 S. Ct. at 2525, nn.2,3,4,5.
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children claimed that commitment to a mental hospital against their
will deprived them of a substantial liberty interest and that due process entitled them to greater procedural protections than those provided by the statute. The children did not claim that they alone
should be permitted to decide whether to seek hospitalization.
Instead, they requested that the decision be made by a neutral factfinder after a formal adversary hearing.39
The Court agreed that a child, in common with adults, has a
substantial liberty interest in not being confined for unnecessary
medical treatment." ° It held, therefore, that due process required
some procedural safeguards to insure that the parent's decision to
commit was not erroneous. An adversarial hearing was not required
though; review by a staff physician with authority to reject the application for admission after evaluating the child's mental and emotional condition and need for treatment adequately protected the
child's interests, the Court said. The opinion does not require the
doctor to conduct any kind of hearing but permits him to rely on
"informal traditional medical investigative techniques.""'
Had the statute reviewed in Parham been applicable to adults, it
almost certainly would have been declared unconstitutional. 2 The
Court nevertheless approved the statute's delegation of power to
parents and limited procedural checks on that power. The Court
said, "[Olur precedents permit the parents to retain a substantial, if
not the dominant role in the decision (to seek voluntary commitment], absent a finding of neglect or abuse."41 3 Parents are given this
authority, the Court said, because "[miost children, even in adolescence, simply are not able to make sound judgments concerning
many decisions, including their need for medical care or treatment.
Parents can and must make those judgments." 4 ' In addition, the
39. 99 S. Ct. at 2504.
40. Id. at 2503.
41. Id. at 2507. The Court also held that continuing reviews, such as those provided by the
statute, were required.
42. The Court has never reviewed a comprehensive statutory scheme for committing adults
to mental institutions. But it has held that a state may not involuntarily commit an adult to a
mental hospital without proving the need for hospitalization by at least clear and convincing
evidence. Addington v. Texas, 99 S. Ct. 1804 (1979). Implicit in this holding is that the wouldbe patient has a right to a formal hearing before he is committed. See also Jackson v. Indiana,
406 U.S. 715 (1972); Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967). Nor can a state forcibly
hospitalize a mentally ill person who is not dangerous and who is capable of surviving safely in
freedom by himself or with the help of willing and responsible family members or friends.
O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
43. 99 S.Ct. at 2505.
44. Id. The Court had explained only a page earlier:
[Tihe law's concept of the family rests on a presumption that parents possess
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Court found that the state had a significant interest in "not imposing
unnecessary procedural obstacles that may discourage the mentally
ill or their families from seeking needed psychiatric assistance." 5
The Court concluded that, though the statute infringed upon one of
a child's "substantial" 6 interests, the strength of the parental and
state interests justified the statutory intrusion."'
Bellotti v. Baird
In Bellotti a child challenged a state statute that denied legal abortions to women less than 18 years old unless they had first sought
parental consent. The statute provided that if either parent refused
to consent, the young woman could petition the superior court to
grant consent for "good cause shown after such hearing as [the
judge] deems necessary.""' The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts had interpreted the statute"" as requiring parents and courts
to act exclusively in the girl's best interests, permitting the court to
refuse consent even to a minor capable of making an informed and
reasonable decision to have an abortion, and requiring all girls to
seek parental consent unless their parents were unavailable or the
what a child lacks in maturity, experience and capacity for judgment required for
making life's difficult decisions. More important, historically it has recognized
that natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their
children. I W. Blackstone, Commentaries* 447; 2 Kent, Commentaries on
American Law* 190.
Id. at 2504.
45. Id. at 2505.
46. Id. at 2503.
47. The statute challenged in Parham permitted either parents or a guardian to initiate the
hospital admission procedure. Two groups of children comprised the class challenging the
statute: the first was composed of children living with their natural parents; the second consisted of children who had been removed from their parents' custody and were wards of the
state. The majority opinion of Chief Justice Burger held that both classes of children were entitled to the same procedural safeguards before being admitted to mental hospitals at the request of their parents or guardians. 99 S. Ct. at 2512-13. The Court directed the lower court to
consider whether additional safeguards were necessary to insure that children who were wards
of the state would not remain committed to hospitals longer than was necessary. Id.
Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, dissenting in part, argued that the statute was
unconstitutional because it did not adequately protect children against an erroneous decision to
commit them to a mental hospital. The dissenting Justices argued that the needs to facilitate
providing mental health care for children and to protect the relationship between parents and
children justified admitting children at their parents' request for a limited period without a
prior hearing. They would, however, have required formal post-admission hearings before a
child could be committed for a substantial period of time. 99 S.Ct. at 2516-21. The dissenters
also found no justification for denying children who were wards of the state pre-admission
commitment hearings, except in exigent circumstances. 99 S. Ct. at 2521-22.
48. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 112, § 12(S) (West 1979), quoted in Bellotti v. Baird, 99 S.
Ct. at 3039.
49. See note lO supra.
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situation presented an emergency. 0 Individuals representing the
class of girls affected by the statute claimed that it unconstitutionally
infringed on the girls' right to decide to have an abortion." The
Court held the statute unconstitutional, but it also offered a detailed
description of restrictions that a state could impose on a minor's
right, restrictions that could not be applied to an adult. 2 The Court
said that a state may require that a minor receive either parental or
judicial consent to her abortion, but it must permit her to seek
judicial consent without asking her parents first. The judge must
grant his consent if he finds (1) that she is sufficiently mature and
well-informed to make the abortion decision independently of her
parents' wishes, or (2) if not, that an abortion would be in her best
interests. 3 In determining whether an abortion would be in the
child's best interests, the court may conclude that it would not if she
has not discussed the decision with her parents."
To reach this result, the Court in Bellotti balanced the child's right
to have an abortion" against her parents' claim to control her upbringing. 6 The Court said that the justification for recognizing the
parents' claim was not inconsistent with the minor's right:
Properly understood, then, the tradition of parental authority
is not inconsistent with our tradition of individual liberty;
rather, the former is one of the basic presuppositions of the latter. Legal restrictions on minors, especially those supportive of
the parental role, may be important to the child's chances for the
full growth and maturity that make eventual participation in a
free society meaningful and rewarding.
50. Baird v. Attorney General, 371 Mass. 741, 360 N.E.2d 288 (1977), summarized in
Bellotti v. Baird, 99 S. Ct. at 3041.
51. The Supreme Court had already held in Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth,
428 U.S. 52 (1976), that a child's right to decide to have an abortion is constitutionally protected and that the state may not give parents an absolute right to veto this decision. Id. at 74.
The Court left open in Danforth and in Bellotti 1, 428 U.S. 132 (1976), the possibility that
states in some circumstances could constitutionally prevent a young or immature minor from
having an abortion without parental consent.
52. See Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973). See also Colautti v. Franklin, 439
U.S. 379 (1979).
53. 99 S.Ct. at 3048.
54. Id. at 3051.
55. The right to decide to have an abortion is "fundamental." See Colautti v. Franklin, 439
U.S. at 386 (interpreting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)). See also Planned Parenthood of
Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 72-75. In addition, the Court in Bellotti discussed the
"unique nature of the abortion decision," which must be made and acted upon within a matter
of weeks, if it is to be effective. 99 S. Ct. at 3047-48.
56. The Court did not discuss whether the state had independent interests that should weigh
in the balance. In light of its opinions in Roe, Doe, Danforth, and Colautti, narrowly defining
what interests a state may assert to regulate abortions, this omission seems understandable.
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. . . Consent and involvement by parents in important deci-

sions by minors long have been recognized as protective of their
immaturity."7
The Court, therefore, approved in principle delegating power to a
girl's parents to determine initially whether she should be permitted
to seek an abortion. It held the Massachusetts statute unconstitutional only because it did not provide adequate procedural safeguards against abuse of that power.
In both Bellotti and Parham the Court determined the constitutionality of the statutes at issue by balancing the competing interests
of parent, child and, where relevent, state."6 For purposes of this
article, the balances the Court struck are not particularly important. 9 More significant are the Court's method of analysis and the
reasons it gives to support a constitutional right in parents to make
important decisions for their children. Parents have this right to protect not only their own interests but also to protect children from
their own immature judgment.
In sharp contrast to the Court's analysis in Bellotti and Parham is
its approach in Fare to the problem of when a minor's waiver of his
Miranda rights is valid. The next section will outline the Fare
approach and will argue that it does not adequately protect the interests of parents and children when children are questioned by
police. An analysis similar to that used in Parham and Bellotti,
which requires consideration of those interests, might well have
caused the Court to reach a different result in Fare.
PROTECTING THE RIGHTS OF PARENTS AND CHILDREN
DURING CUSTODIAL POLICE INTERROGATION OF THE CHILD
The Supreme Court's opinion in Fare discusses tests for determining when a child has asserted his right to remain silent during
custodial police interrogation and when he has validly waived that
right. To make an analysis of these tests meaningful, a brief review
of constitutional rules protecting an accused during police interrogation is helpful. 6"
57. 99 S. Ct. at 3046, 3051 (footnote omitted).
58. This method of analysis follows that prescribed in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319
(1976), for determining what minimal procedural safeguards are necessary before the state may
infringe an individual's protected liberty interest.
59. Challenges to the Court's conclusions can be made. For example, it is not clear why a
minor's interest in resisting institutionalization and loss of physical freedom is apparently less
substantial than her interest in having an abortion. The Parham opinion did not refer to the
Bellotti opinion and Bellotti did not refer to Parham, even though they were decided the same
term.
60. This analysis obviously is not new and relies for much of its content on earlier works. Of
3articular help were L. Levy, Origins of the Fifth Amendment (1968); M. Meltzer, The Right
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Development of ConstitutionalRules ProtectingIndividualsDuring
CustodialInterrogation
When an accused confesses or makes damaging admissions to
state agents, his statement will be inadmissible at a criminal trial if it
was given involuntarily or was taken in violation of his fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 6 2 These rules protect an individual from being convicted of a crime on the basis of an
unreliable confession. 63 They also protect the right of individuals to
require the government to leave them alone unless it can prove that
good cause exists to disturb them. Further, they permit individuals
to refuse to cooperate in proving that cause exists and forbid government agents to force them to cooperate.6
The Supreme Court first held that a state court criminal conviction violated the fourteenth amendment due process clause 65 because
it was based on an "involuntary" confession in 1936 in Brown v.
to Remain Silent (1972); 3 Wigmore Evidence §§ 818, 819, 822, 823, 826 (Chadbourn rev,
1970); 8 Wigmore Evidence § 2251 (McNaughton rev. 1961); Bator and Vorenberg, Arrest,
Detention, Interrogationand the Right to Counsel: Basic Problems and Possible Legislative
Solutions, 66 Colum. L. Rev. 62 (1966); Berger, Burdening the Fifth Amendment: Toward a
Presumptive Barrier Theory, 69 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 27 (1979); Developments in the
Law-Confessions, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 935 (1966); Dix, Mistake, Ignorance, Expectation of
Benefit, and the Modern Law of Confession, 1975 Wash. U.L.Q. (1975); Kamisar, Brewer v.
Williams, Massiah, and Miranda: What is Interrogation?When Does It Matter? 67 Geo. L.J. 1
(1978); Kamisar, What Is an "Involuntary" Confession? Some Comments on Inbau and
Reid's Criminal Interrogation and Confessions, 17 Rut. L. Rev. 728 (1963); Paulsen, The
FourteenthAmendment and the Third Degree, 6 Stan. L. Rev. 411 (1954); Stone, The Miranda
Doctrine in the Burger Court, 1977 Sup. Ct. Rev. 99; Sunderland, Self-Incrimination and Constitutional Principle: Miranda v. Arizona and Beyond, 15 Wake Forest L. Rev. 171 (1979);
White, Police Trickery in Inducing Confessions, 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 581 (1979).
61. Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199
(1960); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959); Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941);
Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
62. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
63. See, e.g., Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S.
315, 320 (1959); Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941). See also 3 Wigmore, supra
note 60, § 822.
64. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966); 8 Wigmore, supra note 60, § 2251.
See also Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961):
At the other pole is a cluster of convictions each expressive, in a different manifestation, of the basic notion that the terrible engine of the criminal law is not to
Cardinal
be used to overreach individuals who stand helpless against it ....
among them, also is the conviction, basic to our legal order, that men are not to
be exploited for the information necessary to condemn them before the law,
that, in Hawkins' words, a prisoner is not "to be made the deluded instrument of
his own conviction." 2 Hawkins, Pleasof the Crown (8th ed. 1824), 595.
367 U.S. at 581 (Frankfurter, J.)
65. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936). At the same time Brown was decided, the
Supreme Court had not yet held that the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination
bound the states. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) first held that due process requires that
individuals be accorded the privilege in state proceedings.
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Mississippi. 6 The circumstances of the case both raised the possibility that the confession was factually unreliable 67 and presented a

clear example of state action inconsistent with "fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and

political institutions." 6
In subsequent cases the Court relied on both of these rationales to

define when a confession was "involuntary" and its use at trial

therefore violative of due process. 69 The Court examined the
methods used to obtain confessions to see if they deprived a person
of "his free choice to admit, to deny, or to refuse to answer." 10 This
test protected an individual from being abused during the interrogation process as well as his right under the American accusatory
criminal justice system to refuse to provide evidence against

himself."
The Court did not establish a bright-line test for determining when
police stepped over constitutionally permissible bounds."' Instead,
reviewing courts were directed to review the "totality of circum-

stances" in each case to determine whether an individual's confession was freely given.'" This test, however, proved unsatisfactory
because of its imprecision. It did not adequately inform police interrogators about what practices they could or could not use to induce
confessions. The test also placed an unmanageable burden on
reviewing courts to determine in every case where an individual challenged the admissibility of his confession whether his will to resist

.had been overborne."'
66. 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
67. A person convicted on the basis of an unreliable confession may well be factually
inreliable. Procedures that contribute to the conviction of innocent persons clearly violate due
)rocess. SeeIn re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
68. 297 U.S. at 286 (quoting Herbert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316(1926)).
69. See, e.g., Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547 (1942); Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219
1941); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940). See also Paulsen, supra note 60, at 414-29;
Camisar, What Is an "Involuntary" Confession?,supra note 60, at 740-47; Dix, supra note 60,
Lt279-81.
70. Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219,241 (1941). See also, e.g., Culombe v. Connecticut,
67 U.S. 568, 582 (1961) (Frankfurter, J.); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206 (1960).
71. See Paulsen, supra note 60, at 417-23; White, supra note 60, at 583-84.
72. However, in Lisenba the Court did say that a confession could not be used if it were obined by physical torture, mob violence, fraud, collusion, trickery, threats or promises. 314
F.S. at 237.
73. See, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1973); Greenwald v. Wisconsin, 390
1.S. 519 (1968); Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361
1.S. 199 (1960); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1939); Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219
941).
74. The burden on courts extended not only to the trial court but also through the appellate
'stem, since the factual conclusion required determined whether a person's constitutional
;hts had been violated. The Supreme Court said that where a factual conclusion determined a
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In the 1966 case of Miranda v. Arizona" the Court promulgated a
new, more objective test for determining when a confession would
be admissible at trial. The Court held that the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination protected individuals during
custodial police interrogation. 76 This holding alone would not have
constitutional issue, it would not rely on the findings of lower courts but would reach its own
conclusions. See also Jackson v. Virginia, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979). See cases cited in note 73
supra.
Kamisar analyzed the Court's decisions in a 1963 article and concluded that the Court first
reviewed the facts to determine whether the interrogator's tactics created substantial risk that
any person subjected to them would falsely confess. If the Court found nothing inherently
wrong with police practices, it considered the peculiar, individual characteristics of the person
confessing to determine if he lacked normal power to resist otherwise permissible practices.
Kamisar, "What Is an 'Involuntary' Confession?, "supra note 60, at 753-58.
75. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
76. The Court had already held that the fifth amendment applies to the states in Malloy v.
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). The Court in Miranda said that it was merely affirming the holding
of Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897), that the fifth amendment protects an individual
during pretrial interrogation. 384 U.S. at 460-65. See also Shotwell Mfg. Co. v. United States,
371 U.S. 341 (1963); Wan v. United States, 266 U.S. 1 (1924); Hardy v. United States, 186 U.S.
224(1902).
The relevant portion of the fifth amendment provides: "[Nlor shall [any person] be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. Const. amend. V.
The English evidentiary rule against use of involuntary confessions developed independently
of the English privilege against self-incrimination. See 3 Wigmore, supra note 60, § 818. But
there is an "indissoluble nexus between the two because both involved the involuntary
acknowledgement of guilt." Levy, supra note 60, at 328. The privilege developed from the
English struggle against use of the oath ex officio in the Court of High Commission and the
Court of Star Chamber. These courts employed inquisitorial, rather than the common law
court's accusatorial, procedure. One of its most significant features was the oath ex officio, so
called because the judge compelled it by virtue of his office. Id. at 47.
The Courts of High Commission and Star Chamber summoned persons before them and required them to swear that they would answer truthfully all questions put to them. A person
taking this oath subjected himself to an impossible dilemma: if he lied in answer to a question,
he committed perjury, subjecting himself not only to civil penalties but also to damnation. If
he answered truthfully, he might be supplying information that would convict him as a heretic
or traitor. Some persons responded to this situation by refusing to take the oath ex officio or
by refusing to answer questions after taking the oath on the ground that it demanded of them
what the law forbade anyone to demand-perjury or self-incrimination. When a person
refused the oath ex officio, the Court could order him to be imprisoned and perhaps tortured
until he agreed to take the oath and to answer questions.
The courts insisted upon sworn confessions for several reasons. Among the most significant
was the rule that treason could be proven only by the testimony of two witnesses to the overt
act or by the accused's confession. Stat. I Edw. 6, c.12, § 22 (1547); Stat. 5 & 6 Edw. 6, c.l,
§ 8 (1554). 3 Wigmore, supra note 60, §§ 818(2), (3). (Compare the rule of some medieval continental systems of criminal procedure, forbidding conviction of a person for serious crimes on
the basis of circumstantial evidence. A person could not be convicted of a crime unless there
were two eyewitnesses to it or he voluntarily confessed. Because of the obvious limitations of
this system, the continental courts developed a system of torture aimed at eliciting confessions
from unrepentant persons. Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. Chi. L. Rev. 3
(1978)).
Two objections to this procedure developed: one practical and one principled. First, because
of the frailty of the human spirit and body, a confession wrung from an accused by torture is
likely not to be the truth but instead a fabrication designed to save him from further torture.
Second, persons argued that it was intrinsically unfair to force a person to speak if the result
was damnation or criminal conviction. See Levy, supra note 60, and Meltzer, supra note 60.
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made the determination of a confession's admissibility more certain.
As the Court recognized, both the fourteenth amendment due process clause and the fifth amendment right to remain silent had been
interpreted as forbidding evidentiary use of confessions under the
same circumstances-when they were not freely and voluntarily
given."'
The Court's more significant step in Miranda was to find that
compulsion to confess is inherent in the circumstances surrounding
custodial interrogation. The Court held, therefore, that a confession
obtained in such circumstances is inadmissible unless police act affirmatively to dispel the compulsion."8 One way of dispelling compulsion was to advise an accused of his right to remain silent and to
"show [him] that his interrogators are prepared to recognize his
privilege should he choose to exercise it." 7' 9 Specifically, the Court
said, an accused should be told (1) that he has a right to remain
silent; (2) that anything he says can be used against him; (3) that he
has the right to a lawyer; and (4) that a lawyer will be provided to
him free if he cannot afford to hire one."0 The Court further held
that statements taken when this information is not given or when the
rights are not knowingly and intelligently waived may not be used as
evidence at trial. 81
The Court's decision in Miranda does not, however, provide a
clear test for determining whether all confessions to police are
admissible. An individual who is told of his rights to counsel and to
remain silent may still choose to forego those rights and confess. If
he later challenges the admissibility of his confession, Miranda
requires a reviewing court to determine whether he "knowingly and
intelligently" waived his rights.8 2 One of the most difficult problems
n applying this standard has been determining just what an accused
iiust "know" before his waiver will be valid. Must he know only
hat he can have a lawyer before he speaks and that he may refuse to
77. In Malloy v. Hogan the Court said:
[Tihe admissibility of a confession in a state criminal prosecution is tested by the
same standard applied in federal prosecutions . . . . Under this test, the constitutional inquiry is . . .whether the confession was "free and voluntary: that
is [it] must not be extracted by any sort of threats or violence, nor obtained by
any direct or implied promises, however slight, nor by the exertion of any improper influence .... " In other words the person must not have been compelled to incriminate himself.
378 U.S. at 7 (quoting Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. at 542-43) (citations omitted).
78. 384U.S. at 458.
79. Id. at 478. The Court said, however, that Congress and the states remained free to devise
other ways to protect a person's right to remain silent. Id. at 467. See also Michigan v. Tucker,
417 U.S. 433,439 (1974).
80. 384 U.S. at 479.
81. Id. at 476, 479.
82. Id. at 475-76.
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speak? Or must he also have some understanding of the consequences to him of relinquishing these rights and agreeing to talk to
police?8 3
The Court's 1979 opinions in Fare and in North Carolina v.
Butlere4 indicate that Miranda requires something more than
abstract knowledge of the rights to counsel and to remain silent. In
Butler the North Carolina Supreme Court held that Miranda
requires an accused explicitly to waive his right to an attorney before
his confession can be admitted against him at trial.8 5 Although the
Supreme Court reversed that holding," the Court's plurality opinion
strongly reaffirmed the original Miranda requirement that the prosecution bear the "heavy burden" 87 of proving that the defendant
"knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against selfincrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel." 8 8 The
Court held that an express waiver is "not inevitably either necessary
or sufficient to establish waiver. The question is not one of form, but
whether the defendant in fact knowingly and voluntarily waived the
rights delineated in the Mirandacase." 89 The Constitution requires a
reviewing court to judge the validity of a Mirandawaiver by looking
at the totality of circumstances, "including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused." 9"
The plurality adopted the totality test from Johnson v. Zerbst9 '
which concerned the validity of an accused's in-court waiver of his
right to counsel. Johnson had equated a "knowing and intelligent
waiver" with the "intentional relinquishment of a known right or
83. Several commentators have discussed this question. See Dix, supra note 60, at 331-33;
Kamisar, What is "Interrogation"?,supra note 60, at 48; White, supra note 60, at 589. White
interprets Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 442-43 (1974), as holding that Miranda does not
require that suspects be afforded the opportunity for intelligent exercise of the right to remain
silent at each point in the interrogation. See also Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 243 (1966).
Other issues unresolved by Mirandawhich are not germane to this paper include: (1) When is
a person in custody and therefore entitled to warnings? See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492
(1977); Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976). (2) Are the warnings themselves constitutionally required? See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 443 (1974). (3) May the police
resume questioning of an individual who has asserted his right to remain silent? See Michigan
v..Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975).
84. 99 S. Ct. 1755 (1979).
85. 295 N.C. 250, 244 S.E.2d 410 (1978), vacated andremanded, 99 S. Ct. 1755 (1979).
86. 99 S. Ct. at 1757. Cf. Commonwealth v. Bussey, .__A.2d_, 25 Crim. L. Rep. 2550
(Pa. Aug. 27, 1979) (holding that an in-custody suspect must explicitly waive his Miranda
rights).
87. 99 S. Ct. at 1757 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 476).
88. 99 S. Ct. at 1757.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1758 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)).
91. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
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privilege.'"I In cases following Johnson, the Court has held that a
trial court must inquire into an individual's understanding of the
consequences of waiving constitutional rights before it finds that he
has knowingly and intelligently waived them.9"
The combination of the Court's reliance on Johnson and its

admonition to trial courts to determine the validity of an individual's waiver of Miranda rights in light of his background and
experience strongly suggests that mere understanding of the words
of the Miranda warning is not sufficient for a valid waiver. The
Butler opinion implies that an individual must also have some comprehension of the significance of giving up his rights before his
waiver will be valid.
Language from the Court's opinion in Fare supports this conclusion. The Court there held that to determine whether a juvenile has
validly waived his Mirandarights, a reviewing court must look at the
totality of circumstances to judge the juvenile's "capacity to understand the warnings given him, the nature of his fifth amendment
rights, and the consequences of waiving those rights.""'
Fare and Butler indicate, then, that the compulsion inherent during custodial interrogation is not dispelled merely by warning an accused of his rights to counsel and to remain silent. Before he can be
questioned, he must freely relinquish those rights with some under92. Id. at 464. Immediately after its citation to Johnson, the Butler plurality opinion also
cites Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973), without comment. The Schneckloth
Court, in an opinion written by Mr. Justice Stewart, who also wrote the plurality opinion in
Butler, distinguished the standard for judging the validity of a consent to search from the standard for judging a waiver of Miranda rights. Because Miranda protects the privilege against
self-incrimination, a right needed to protect the fairness of the trial itself, the standard for
judging waiver of Miranda rights is the same as the Johnson standard for judging waiver of
right to counsel. 412 U.S. at 420. In contrast, consent to a search, which amounts to relinquishment of fourth amendment rights, may be valid even though the individual did not know of his
rights because the "protections of the Fourth Amendment ... have nothing whatever to do
with promoting the fair ascertainment of truth at a criminal trial." Id. at 242.
Mr. Justice Blackmun concurred in the judgment of the Court in Butler rather than joining
in the plurality opinion because he rejected the idea that the Johnson v. Zerbst " 'intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right' formula . . . has any relevance in determining whether a defendant has waived his 'right to the presence of a lawyer,' . . . under
Miranda'sprophylactic rule." 99 S. Ct. at 1759. That Justice Blackmun felt it necessary to
make this point suggests that the plurality opinion, in which three Justices joined, means what
it says by its citation to Johnson. Further, three Justices, Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens,
dissented because they would have gone further and required an express written or oral waiver
of Mirandarights. 99 S. Ct. at 1759-60.
93. See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 236-40; Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S.
238 (1969); Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962). See also Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S.
708 (1948) (plurality opinion of Mr. Justice Black); Tigar, Waiver of ConstitutionalRights:
Disquiet in the Citadel,84 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1970).
94. 99 S. Ct. at 2572.
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standing of the effect of his action. 5 Only then may a court find that

he has not been coerced to confess in violation of his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
All of the Supreme Court's decisions interpreting Miranda except
Fare concern the admissibility of adults' confessions. In Fare the
Court, for the first time, considered whether the Miranda requirements should be modified when a child is subjected to custodial
police interrogation.
Modifying the Miranda Waiver Test to ProtectRights of Parents
and Children.
Fare v. Michael C.' 6 concerned the admissibility of a child's confession given to police after he had been advised of and had waived
his Mirandarights."' The child, Michael C., was arrested for murder
95. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974) may be interpreted as holding that the fifth
amendment test is the same as the old due process voluntariness test. See note 60 supra, at 589.
If this is true, the waiver analysis in the text admittedly makes no sense, since a person certainly
did not have to make a "knowing and intelligent waiver" of anything before his confession
would be deemed voluntary.
However, the Tucker opinion is, by its own terms, limited to situations in which the "Miranda
violation" occurred before Mirandawas decided. 417 U.S. at 447. In this narrow situation, the
Court said, invoking Mirandato render inadmissible the fruits of the defendant's statements to
police would not have a significant deterrent effect on police. 417 U.S. at 447-48. Further, if
the Court in Tucker had meant to direct lower courts to review confessions only for voluntariness, its later comments in Butler and Fare would be nonsensical.
96. 99 S. Ct. at 2560.
97. The Supreme Court has never held that Miranda warnings must be given to juveniles
before police custodial interrogation. In Fare the Court assumed without deciding that Michael
C. was entitled to Miranda'sprotections. 99 S. Ct. at 2567 n.4.
The fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, upon which Mirandais premised
(see text accompanying notes 75-76 supra), does not explicitly protect children subject to delinquency proceedings in juvenile court since by its terms it is limited to "criminal cases." See
note 76 supra. However, in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), the Supreme Court held that
juveniles are entitled to due process during such proceedings. Further, it held that due process
requires that juveniles who are charged as delinquents and face possible incarceration must be
accorded the right to remain silent during their "adjudicatory hearings," i.e., trials. Id. at
43-57. In Gault the Court strongly suggested, but did not decide, that juveniles are also entitled
to Miranda'sprotections. 387 U.S. at 44-49, 52-55.
Gault and subsequent Supreme Court cases concerning juvenile court proceedings provide a
method of analysis for determining whether Miranda protects juveniles. Due process requires
that juvenile court proceedings be fundamentally fair. Thus, juveniles are entitled to any procedural safeguard necessary for fundamental fairness. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 531
(1975); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 543 (1971); In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 30-31.
The first issue, then, is whether fundamental fairness requires that juveniles be accorded the
right to remain silent during custodial police interrogation. If so, must the Miranda rights to
warnings and to counsel, unless waived, also be provided? In Miranda the Supreme Court held
that the fourteenth amendment due process clause requires extending the right to remain silent
to an individual during custodial interrogation for two reasons: to protect his right to require
"the government seeking to punish [him to] produce the evidence against him by its own independent labors," and to protect his rights at trial. 384 U.S. at 460-66.
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and brought to a police station for questioning. After being given
Miranda warnings, the juvenile asked to see his probation officer
and rejected the offer of an attorney because he feared the police
would "pull [a] police officer in and tell me he's an attorney." 98 The
police refused to call the probation officer, and Michael agreed to

answer questions. His statements incriminated him in the murder,
and he was eventually adjudged delinquent, in substantial part on
the basis of his confession.
The California Supreme Court reversed the delinquency adjudication, holding that the confession was taken in violation of
Michael's rights under Miranda because his request to see his probation officer was "essentially a 'call for help' " that "indicated that
In Gault the Supreme Court held that due process requires that a juvenile, like an adult, be
permitted to put the government to its burden of proof without coercing an admission from
him. 387 U.S. at 47. Further, a juvenile's right to remain silent at trial is meaningless, just as is
an adult's, if police can compel him to confess and introduce the confession as evidence against
him. See also Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 240 (1973) discussed at note 92 supra.
For these reasons, a juvenile's right to remain silent must be protected during custodial interrogation.
The more difficult question is whether fundamental fairness also requires that juveniles be
given Miranda protections. Miranda's warnings and right to counsel are not constitutionally
required. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974). However, the Constitution does require that the compulsion inherent during custodial interrogation be dispelled by warnings and
the right to counsel or by some other equally effective means. Id. at 439; Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. at 467. The circumstances of custodial interrogation are no less coercive when the person questioned is a child rather than an adult. This compulsion must be dispelled to protect a
child's right to remain silent. If the court sanctioned some method other than Miranda's protections as achieving this goal for adults, the method might well be valid for juveniles as well.
To date, however, the Court has approved no other method. Until it does, juveniles are entitled
to Miranda's specific protections to the same extent as adults.
These arguments are by now commonplace, and virtually every court deciding the question
has held that Miranda warnings must be given to juveniles subject to custodial interrogation.
See, e.g., In re Creek, 243 A.2d 49 (D.C. 1968); Arnold v. State, 265 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 1972),
cert. denied, 265 So. 2d 64 (1973); People v. Pierre, 114 111.App. 2d 283, 252 N.E.2d 706
(1969). Most appellate courts assume without discussion that Miranda warnings must be given
to juveniles and consider instead whether rights have been validly waived. A possible exception
is the New Jersey Supreme Court which has held as a matter of law that a child of ten "lacks
the capability to fully understand the meaning of his rights. Thus, he cannot make a knowing
and intelligent waiver of something he cannot understand." State ex. rel S.H., 61 N.J. 108,
__
293 A.2d 181, 184-85 (1972). Despite the child's incapacity, the court said that such a
child may still be interrogated "if the questioning is conducted with the utmost fairness and in
accordance with the highest standards of due process and fundamental fairness." Id. at
293 A.2d at 185.
In addition, several states by statute require that a juvenile be advised of his right to remain
silent prior to custodial interrogation. See, e.g., Calif. Welf. & Inst. Code § 625 (West 1972);
Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 19-2-102(3)(c)(I) (1973); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 17-66d(a) (West
Supp. 1978); Ga. Code Ann. § 24A-2002(b) (Supp. 1979); N.D. Cent. Code § 27-20-27(2)
(RepI. 1974); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, § 1109(a) (West Supp. 1979); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.
§ 6338(b) (Purdon Pamph. 1979); Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-227 (1979); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 33,
§ 652 (Supp. 1979).
98. 99 S. Ct. at 2564.
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the minor intended to assert his Fifth Amendment privilege." 99 The
court based its conclusion on the statutory obligation of a probation
officer to "represent the interests" of the juvenile' ° and the close
and trusting relationship that in fact existed between Michael and his
probation officer.'II The court said:
It would certainly severely restrict the "protective devices"
required by Mirandain cases where the suspects are minors if the
only call for help which is to be deemed an invocation of the privilege is the call for an attorney. It is fatuous to assume that a
minor in custody will be in a position to call an attorney for
assistance and it is unrealistic to attribute no significance to his
call for help from the only person to whom he normally looksa parent or guardian.' 2 It is common knowledge that this is the
normal reaction of
a youthful suspect who finds himself in trou03
ble with the law.'

The Supreme Court reversed, calling the California court's holding an unwarranted extension of the per se aspects of the Miranda
safeguards.'0 " The Court emphasized that Miranda requires that an
accused be permitted to consult with an attorney prior to custodial
interrogation because the attorney's training and duty of loyalty to
his client make him uniquely capable of helping his client protect his

right to remain silent.'

5

Since a probation officer is neither legally

trained, nor does he owe undivided loyalty to his charges, 0

6

he

99. In re Michael C., 21 Cal. 3d 471, 476, 579 P.2d 7, 10, 146 Cal. Rptr. 358, 361 (1978),
rev'd sub nom. Fare v. Michael C., 99 S. Ct. 2560 (1979).
100. The court cited Calif. Welf. & Inst. Code § 280 (West Supp. 1978).
101. 21 Cal. 3d at 475, 579 P.2d at 9-10, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 360-61.
102. The case from which the California court in Michael C. took this quotation was People
v. Burton, 6 Cal. 3d 375, 382, 491 P.2d 793,797, 99 Cal. Rptr. 1, 5 (1971). In Burton the court
held that a child's request to see his parent constituted an invocation of his right to remain
silent. This conduct, the court said, appeared inconsistent with a present willingness to discuss
his case freely and completely with the police. 6 Cal. 3d at 382, 491 P.2d at 797, 99 Cal. Rptr.
at 5. In Michael C. the California court extended this reasoning to find that Michael C.'s request to speak to his trusted probation officer also invoked his right to remain silent.
In Miranda, the Court said, "If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to
or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease." 384 U.S.
at 473-74 (emphasis added). But see Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975).
103. 21 Cal. 3d at 476, 579 P.2d at 9, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 360-61 (quoting People v. Burton, 6
Cal. 3d 375, 382, 491 P.2d 793, 797, 99 Cal. Rptr. 1, 5 (1971)).
104. 99 S. Ct. at 2567, 2570-71. The "per se" aspect of Miranda to which the Court refers
seems to be the rule that if a person says he wants to see an attorney, interrogation must cease
until an attorney is present. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 474.
105. 99 S. Ct. at 2569.
106. The Court described the California probation officer as "a peace officer" who is
"duty bound to report wrongdoing by the juvenile when it comes to his attention, even if by
communication from the juvenile himself." Id.
The Supreme Court's discussion of this point emphasized that a probation officer does not

Summer 1980]

CHILDREN'S WAIVER OF MIRANDA RIGHTS

07
cannot serve the same protective function that an attorney does. 1
The Court then turned to the question of whether Michael had
validly waived his rights, a question the California court had not addressed.' 8 The Court held that the totality of circumstances test'0 9
was adequate to test even a juvenile's waiver. ,,0
The totality approach permits-indeed, it mandates-inquiry
into all the circumstances surrounding the interrogation. This
includes evaluation of the juvenile's age, experience, education,
background, and intelligence, and into whether he has the
capacity to understand the warningsgiven him, the nature of his
fifth amendment rights, and the consequences of waiving those
rights.
. . . There is no reason to assume that [juvenile] courts...
with their special expertise in this area, will be unable to apply
the totality of the circumstances analysis so as to take into
account those special concerns that are present when young persons, often with limited experience and education and with
immature judgment, are involved. Where the age and experience
of a juvenile indicate that his request for his probation officer or
his parents is, in fact, an invocation of his right to remain silent,
the totality approach will allow the court the necessary flexibility
to take this into account in making a waiver determination. At
the same time, that approach refrains from imposing rigid
restraints on police and courts in dealing with an experienced
older juvenile with an extensive prior record who knowingly and
intelligently waives his Fifth Amendment rights and [confesses]
voluntarily ...
."
The Court concluded that nothing in the record affirmatively
showed that Michael had not understood the Miranda warnings
given him or "was unable to understand the nature of his actions."" He had "considerable experience with the police." 3 . .
play the same kind of role in advising his clients that an attorney does. However, the California
court had interpreted Michael C.'s request as an invocation of his fifth amendment right to remain silent, not his Miranda right to speak to an attorney. In re Michael C., 21 Cal. 3d at 476,
579 P.2d at 10, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 361. The Supreme Court's comparison of the roles of probation officers and attorneys suggests that it was rejecting the latter proposition. To this extent,
the Court's opinion is unresponsive to the lower court's holding.
107. 99S. Ct. at 2569.
108. Id. at 2572.
109. See text accompanying note 90 supra, for a description of the test.
110. 99 S. Ct. at 2572.
111. Id. (emphasis added). The Court cited North Carolina v. Butler, 99 S. Ct. 1755 (1979).
112. 99S. Ct. at 2572.
113. As a practical matter, that a child with a lengthy prior record continues to agree to
police interrogation suggests not that he is street wise and is making an intelligent tactical
choice, but rather that he does not understand what is going on or that he has not learned from
his own experience.
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There is no indication that he was of insufficient intelligence to
understand the rights he was waiving, or what the consequences of
that waiver would be. He was not worn down by improper interrogation tactics. .
"" Therefore, the Court concluded that his waiver
was valid.' II
The sufficiency of the Court's analysis in Faredepends on whether
it adequately protects the rights of all those whose interests may be
affected when a child decides whether to waive his Miranda rights
and confesses to police. As the Court recognized, the state and the
child have interests that must be considered." 6 The Court did not
consider, however, whether a child's parents also have independent
interests worthy of protection, perhaps because neither Michael C.'s
parents nor anyone representing them argued their claims to the
Court. ' I7
Research has uncovered no case which discusses whether parents'
rights are affected when their child decides whether to waive his
Mirandarights. Parents do, however, have interests protected by the
Meyer-Pierce line of cases' I which could be considered. Custodial
interrogation of a child in his parents' absence infringes on their
right to control his upbringing in two ways. First, a child who confesses to a delinquent act is very likely to be charged in juvenile
court, adjudged delinquent,' "9 and subjected to sanctions up to and
including incarceration for a period of years.'2 ° Even if the court
114. 99 S. Ct. at 2572-73.
115. Id. at 2573.
116. Id.at 2572.
117. Neither the California nor the Supreme Court opinion suggests that anyone argued to
protect the rights of Michael C.'s parents.
118. See notes 17-29 and accompanying text supra. The Supreme Court has held that a
parent has a protectible interest in custody of his child in adoption proceedings. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965). Lower courts have
recognized that parents have a protectible interest in custody of their children in neglect and
termination of parental rights proceedings. See, e.g., Sims v. State Dept. of Pub. Welfare, 438
F. Supp. 1179 (S.D. Tex. 1977), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Moore v. Sims, 99 S. Ct.
2371 (1979); Alsager v. District Ct., 406 F. Supp. 10 (S.D. Iowa 1975), aff'd, 545 F.2d 1137
(8th Cir. 1976); In re B.G., I I Cal. 3d 679, 523 P.2d 244, 114 Cal. Rptr. 444 (1974).
119. His confession alone in some states might be sufficient evidence against him though
several states by statute require that a juvenile's confession be corroborated. See Ga. Code
Ann. § 24A-2002(b) (Supp. 1979); Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. § 3-819(b) (Supp. 1979);
N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 744(b) (McKinney 1975); N.D. Cent. Code § 27-20-27(2) (Repl. 1974); 42
Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 6338(b) (Purdon Pamph. 1979); Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-227(b) (Repl.
1977). Seealso D.C.A. v. State, 135 Ga. App. 234, 217 S.E.2d 470 (1975); In re W.J., 116 N.J.
Super. 462, 282 A.2d 770 (1971).
120. Every jurisdiction permits the juvenile court under some circumstances to commit a
child to a juvenile institution if he is adjudged guilty of a delinquent act. See S. Davis, Rights
of Juveniles: The Juvenile Justice System § 6.03 (1974); IJA-ABA Juvenile Justice Standards
Project, Standards Relating to Juvenile Delinquency and Sanctions, Part V: Sanctions (Tent.
Draft 1977).
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imposes a lesser punishment, such as a term of probation, its assertion of authority over the child necessarily diminishes the child's
parents' freedom to control his life.' 2 , Second, the decision to waive
Miranda rights and confess constitutes a relinquishment of the right
to refuse to provide evidence for one's own conviction.' 2 2 A child's
parents might well have strong principled views about how this decision should be made which they would want their child to consider.
Parents who believe that individuals have a duty to confess wrongdoing and accept its consequences might advise their child to confess. If, on the other hand, they believe that the government should
always bear the burden of producing evidence to justify intervening
in a person's life, they might advise him to remain silent.
If parents are not permitted to advise their child before he decides
whether to waive his Miranda rights, they lose a significant opportunity to assert their rights to custody and control of him and to
inculcate him with their values. 23 For this reason alone, the Court's
analysis in Fareseems inadequate. However, a parent's independent
right to control his child may be deemed too attenuated to warrant
consideration in this context. If so, the only question left is whether
Fareadequately protects the interests of the state and the child.
The Court's opinion in Fare defines well the state's independent
interest in not imposing rigid restraints on police and courts dealing
with juveniles who knowingly and intelligently waive their fifth
amendment rights and confess voluntarily. 2 " The child's interest
which the Court recognized is being protected against loss of his
right to remain silent either because he does not understand the
Miranda warnings, the nature of his rights, and the consequences of
giving them up or because he cannot make a mature judgment about
the wisdom of relinquishing his rights.' 25 In two pre-Miranda decisions the Court also recognized that a child needs special protection
against police pressure to confess. In Haley v. Ohio' 6 and Gallegos
v. Colorado'27 the Court held children's confessions in criminal
trials' 28 inadmissible under the due process voluntariness test, in part
121. It might be argued that even if a parent does have a right to custody and control of his
child, he loses it by permitting the child to commit a delinquent act or not controlling him well
enough to prevent it. Regardless of the validity of this argument in other contexts, it has no
place here because it assumes what has yet to be proven: that the child committed the act.
122. See notes 63, 74-80 and accompanying text supra.
123. Certainly parents might discuss their views on the question of principle with their child
at other times if the question happened to come up. But it might not come up.
124. 99 S. Ct. at 2572.
125. Id.
126. 332 U.S. 596 (1948).
127. 370 U.S. 49 (1962).
128. Both Haley, who was 15, and Gallegos, who was 14, were charged with murder and
tried as adults.
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because the facts of those cases suggested that the children did not
have the capacity to resist police pressure. In Haley the Court said:
What transpired would make us pause for careful inquiry if a
mature man were involved. And when, as here, a mere child-an
easy victim of the law-is before us, special care in scrutinizing
the record must be used. Age 15 is a tender and difficult age for
a boy of any race. He cannot be judged by the more exacting
standards of maturity. That which would leave a man cold and
unimpressedcan overawe and overwhelm a lad in his early teens.
This is the period of great instability which the crisis of adolescence produces. A 15-year-old lad, questioned through the dead
of night by relays of police, is a ready victim of the inquisition.
Mature men might stand the ordeal from midnight to 5 a.m. But
we cannot believe that a lad of tender years is a match for the
police in such a contest. He needs counsel and support if he is
not to become the victim first of fear, then of panic. He needs
someone on whom to lean lest the overpowering presence of the
law, as he knows it, crush him. 9
In Gallegos the Court discussed a child's inherent lack of capacity to
understand his predicament and protect himself:
But a 14-year-old boy, no matter how sophisticated, is unlikely
to have any conception of what will confront him when he is
made accessible only to the police. That is to say, we deal with a
person who is not equal to the police in knowledge and understandingof the questions and answers being recordedand who is
unable to know how to protect his own interests or how to get
the benefits of his constitutionalrights.'30
129. 332 U.S. at 599-600 (emphasis added).
130. 370 U.S. at 54 (emphasis added). In neither Haley nor Gallegos, of course, did the
Court hold that a child's confession is per se admissible if made without adult advice. Such a
holding would have been extraordinary, considering the state of the law of confessions at that
time. The Court had not yet held that any confessions were per se inadmissible; Miranda was
decided four years after Gallegos. Further, the Court could not have said that a child could
never freely choose to confess, which is the only requirement for admissibility of a confession
under the due process test. See note 70 and accompanying text supra.
The only other case in which the Court has even referred to the admissibility of a child's confession is In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), which was decided after Miranda. Though Gault did
not hold Miranda applicable to juveniles, language in that opinion may give some guidance for
judging waivers of Mirandarights.
We appreciate that special problems may arise with respect to waiver of the
privilege by or on behalf of children, and that there may well be some difference
in techniques-but not in principle-dependingupon the age of the child and the
presence and competence of parents. The participation of counsel will, of
course, assist the police, Juvenile Courts and appellate tribunals in administering
the privilege. If counsel was not present for some permissible reason when an
admission was obtained, the greatest care must be taken to assure that the admission was voluntary, in the sense not only that it was not coerced or suggested, but
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The Court in Fare, like most lower courts, ,3 I held that these interests of state and child are adequately protected by assessing the
validity of a child's waiver of his Miranda rights from the totality of
circumstances surrounding the waiver.' 32 As applied in Fare, however, the test seems inadequate. The Court held that no facts showed
that Michael C. had not knowingly and intelligently waived his
rights. It did not discuss the significance of his request to see his probation officer, though the most obvious explanation for the request
is that Michael believed he needed help before deciding to waive his
also that it was not the product of ignorance of rights or of adolescent fantasy,
fright or despair.
387 U.S. at 55 (emphasis added).
The italicized portion of this passage might be interpreted as permitting a child's waiver to be
judged by the same standards used for an adult, but its context and ambiguity and the Court's
reference to presence of parents and counsel suggest a different interpretation. First, this
passage comes at the end of the portion of the Court's opinion rejecting arguments that a child
in juvenile court should not have the right to remain silent because of the benevolent aims of
the juvenile court. Id. at 49-55. Thus, its reference to "differences in technique-but not in
principle" may be an admonition to judge the validity of a juvenile's waiver by standards
equally rigorous as those applied to an adult's waiver. Second, the references to the presence of
parents and the command to scrutinize confessions obtained in the absence of counsel with
great care may suggest an assumption that a child ordinarily will have adult advice before he
confesses. Finally, it is not clear from the context whether the Court is addressing the admissibility of a child's pretrial confession or his in-court admissions. For these reasons, this
passage of Gault should not be read as holding that a child's waiver of Miranda rights must be
judged by the same totality of circumstances test used to judge an adult's waiver.
131. See, e.g., United States Courts of Appeals-United States v. Barfield, 507 F.2d 53 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 950 (1975); United States v. Miller, 453 F.2d 634 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 923 (1972); Lopez v. United States, 399 F.2d 865 (9th Cir. 1968); ArkansasMosley v. State, 246 Ark. 358, 438 S.W.2d 311 (1969); Arizona-State v. Jackson, 118 Ariz.
270, 576 P.2d 129 (1978); California-People v. Lara, 67 Cal. 2d 365, 432 P.2d 202, 62 Cal.
Rptr. 586 (1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 945 (1968); but see People v. Burton, 6 Cal. 3d 375,
491 P.2d 793, 99 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1971); District of Columbia-In re T.T.T., 365 A.2d 366 (D.C.
1976); Florida-Doerr v. State, 348 So. 2d 938 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Georgia-Crawford
v. State, 240 Ga. 321, 240 S.E.2d 824 (1977); Idaho-State v. Dillon, 93 Idaho 698, 471 P.2d
553 (1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 942 (1971); Illinois-In re Stiff, 32 Ill. App. 3d 971, 336
N.E.2d 619 (1975); Kansas-State v. Hinkle, 206 Kan. 472, 479 P.2d 841 (1971);
Maryland-In re Appeal No. 245 (75), 29 Md. App. 131, 349 A.2d 434 (Ct. Sp. App. 1975);
Missouri-State v. Wright, 515 S.W.2d 421, 430-31 (Mo. 1974) (however, parent present during interrogation); cf., In re K.W.B., 500 S.W.2d 275 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973) (holding that the
child's parent must be informed of the right to remain silent as well); State v. White, 494
S.W.2d 687 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973) (holding that the child's parents must also be informed of the
right to remain silent); Nebraska-State v. Lytle, 194 Neb. 353, 231 N.W.2d 681 (1975); North
Carolina-State v. Dawson, 278 N.C. 351, 180 S.E.2d 140 (1971); Ohio-State v. Carder, 3
Ohio App. 2d 241, 210 N.E.2d 714 (1965), aff'd, 9 Ohio St. 2d 1, 222 N.E.2d 620 (1966); South
Carolina-In re Williams, 265 S.C. 295, 217 S.E.2d 719 (1975); Tennessee-Vaughn v. State, 3
Tenn. Crim. App. 54, 456 S.W.2d 879 (1970); Utah-State v. Hunt, Utah 2d , 607
P.2d 297 (1980); Virginia-Harris v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 715, 232 S.E.2d 751 (1977);
Washington-State v. Prater, 77 Wash. 2d 526, 463 P.2d 640 (1970); but see Wash. Rev. Code
Ann. § 13.40.140(10) (Supp. 1978); Wisconsin-Theriault v. State, 66 Wis. 2d 33, 223 N.W.2d
850 (1974).
132. 99S. Ct. at 2572.
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rights. He rejected the offer of an attorney, not on the merits, but
because he feared that the police would "pull [a] police officer in
and tell me he's an attorney."' 3 3 Other facts not mentioned in the
Supreme Court opinion but outlined in the lower court opinion
strengthen this conclusion. The interrogating officer seems to have
reinforced Michael's fear that an "attorney" brought to him would
in fact be a policeman by saying at some point during the interrogation, "Well, we don't always play fair, do we?""'3 Further,
Michael's probation officer testified at trial that he had "instructed
Michael that at any time he has a police contact, even if they stop
him and talk to him on the street, he is to contact me immediately"
because "many times kids don't understand what is going on, and
what they are supposed to do relative to police .
"..."I35 In addition, the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Powell in Farepoints out
that Michael was "immature, emotional, and uneducated," making
him susceptible to the two-on-one interrogation to which he was subjected,' 36 and that he was crying during his interrogation. ' The
facts seem to create substantial doubt that Michael "knowingly and
intelligently" waived his fifth amendment rights. I"
Even if the Court's conclusion on the facts of this case was correct, a substantial objection to the totality test, as applied in the
opinion, remains. The Court recognized that whenever a juvenile
purports to waive Miranda rights, a reviewing court must inquire
whether he "has the capacity to understand the warnings given him,
the nature of his fifth amendment rights, and the consequences of
waiving those rights."'" In Fare the Court seems to have put the
burden on Michael of proving that he lacked this capacity.' 0 This
133. Id. at 2564.
134. 21 Cal. 3d at 476, 579 P.2d at 10, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 361 n.3.
135. Id. at 476, 579 P.2d at 9, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 361 n.2.
136. 99 S. Ct. at 2576 (Powell, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
137. Id. at n.2.
138. This analysis suggests that if the police had wanted to obtain an admissible confession
from Michael, they should not have questioned him until he had had an opportunity to consult
with an interested adult. Given the role of the probation officer outlined in the Court's opinion, consultation with him might well not have sufficed. See note 106 supra. The concurring
opinion of Mr. Justice Powell notes that Michael had a poor relationship with his parents. 99
S.Ct. at 2576. Therefore he may not have wanted to talk to them. Under these circumstances,
the police should have refrained from questioning Michael until he had an attorney, perhaps
one for whom his probation officer vouched.
139. 99 S. Ct. at 2572.
140. The Court speaks of lack of evidence that Michael failed to understand the warnings or
that he was not sufficiently intelligent to understand the warnings. Id. On the other hand, the
only evidence suggesting that Michael had such capacity was his age, 16, and the fact that he
had had prior contacts with police and~the juvenile justice system. Id.; see note 113 and accompanying text supra.
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allocation of the burden seems to reflect a presumption that a child
has capacity unless the child proves otherwise. It most benefits
children who are sufficiently self-aware to recognize at the time of
questioning that they need help. Children who lack this awareness
and who may, therefore, need help even more, bear the heavy
burden of producing evidence of their incapacity at a suppression
hearing.
Presuming that a child has capacity to waive his rights knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily may make it easier for police to get a
confession from him that will later be admissible. But the limited
protection that the totality test as applied in Fare gives to a child's
fifth amendment privilege contrasts sharply with the Court's expressed concern in Parhamand Bellotti that a child alone may make
other important decisions unwisely. In those opinions the Court held
that the need to protect a child from making an ill-advised decision
to have an abortion or to resist institutionalization in a mental
hospital is so significant that a state may require that the decision be
subject to control of the child's parent. "' Indeed, the state may deny
all children the right even to participate in the institutionalization
decision,'" 2 and it may delegate the abortion decision to the child's
parent or a court if the minor is "immature."' 4 3 Only a "mature"
minor can make her own abortion decision, and she must first convince the court that "she has attained4 4 sufficient maturity to make
her abortion decision independently."'

The Court's rationale for its decisions in Parham and Bellotti does
not require that a child be presumed incapable of waiving his Miranda
rights. In those cases the Court merely sanctioned the state's underlying presumption that a child is incapable of making certain decisions. The Court, however, attached so much weight to this presumption that it was willing to let a state deprive a child of the power
to make decisions affecting "substantial"' 4 5 and even "fundamental""' 6 rights on the basis of it. A child who must decide whether
to waive his Miranda rights faces a decision as difficult and significant as the decisions to have an abortion or forego treatment in a
mental hospital. The decision to waive Mirandarights is in essence a
141. See notes 43-44, 51-57 and accompanying text supra.
142. Parham v. J.R., 99 S. Ct. 2493 (1979), gives parents the power to make the initial decision, subject to approval by a physician reviewing for medical need. Id. at 2506. The physician
must interview the child, but the child's wish not to go to a mental hospital would have no
necessary impact on the medical decision.
143. Bellotti v. Baird, 99 S.Ct. at 3048.
144. Id. at 3052.
145. Parham v. J.R., 99 S.Ct. at 2503.
146. See note 55 supra.
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relinquishment of the basic right to resist state intervention into
one's life and represents agreement to cooperate by producing
powerful evidence of criminal conduct against oneself-a confession
of guilt or at least damaging admissions.'" The decision is particularly difficult because, to make a wise choice, the suspect must be
able to relate the abstract warnings to the reality of the potential consequences of a waiver in a later criminal prosecution. Furthermore, a
juvenile who confesses is likely later to plead guilty in juvenile
court;' 4 if he does not, the court may adjudicate him delinquent on
the basis of his confession alone or a confession with corroborating
evidence.' 4 9 The child will then be subject to incarceration for a term
of years up to the time he reaches majority and perhaps beyond." '
He will be labeled a "delinquent," which, as the Supreme Court
itself has recognized, is only slightly less stigmatizing than being
labeled "criminal."' 5 The practical consequences, then, of decisions to waive Mirandarights can be as great as the consequences of
decisions to have an abortion or to forego mental hospitalization.
Therefore, the thesis underlying Parham and Bellotti-that a child,
because of his immaturity, needs protection against making an unsound decision-should also be applied to require greater safeguards
against loss of Miranda rights than those provided in Fare. The
available empirical evidence supports this conclusion: it shows that
most teenagers studied did not thoroughly understand their rights
and were not capable of making a "knowing and intelligent" waiver
decision.' 2
To insure that a child's waiver of his rights is "knowing and intelligent," the totality of circumstances test for judging the validity of
147. See notes 64, 75-82 and accompanying text supra.
148. See generally IJA-ABA Juvenile Justice Standards Project, Standards Relating to
Adjudication, Std 3.3 note (Tent. Draft 1977). ABA Project on Standards for Criminal
Justice, Introduction to Standards Relating to Pleas of Guilty (Approved Draft 1968).
149. See note 119 supra.
150. See note 120 supra.
151. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 23-24.
152. See Ferguson & Douglas, A Study of Juvenile Waiver, 7 U. San Diego L. Rev. 39
(1970). They tested mostly 14-year-olds, some with extensive police contact and some with little
or none, to determine if, after being read both standardized and simplified forms of the Miranda
warnings, they understood what their rights were. The researchers concluded that though 86 of
the 90 subjects "waived" their rights, only five understood them. Delinquent children
understood their rights better than nondelinquent children did but less than half of them
understood, for example, that they had the right to an attorney at the time of interrogation. Id.
at 45, 46. See also Lefstein, Stapleton & Teitelbaum, In Search of Juvenile Justice: Gault and
Its Implementation, 3 L. & Soc. Rev. 491, 537-39 (1969).
A recent survey of state case law concludes that courts ordinarily hold that the age alone of a
child older than 14 or 15 is insufficient to prove that he did not knowingly and intelligently
waive his rights. National Juvenile Law Center, Law and Tactics in Juvenile Cases 77 (1974).
See also Davis, supra note 120, at 94.
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the waiver might be retained but modified to require that a child
younger than a certain age' 3 be presumed incapable of waiving his
Miranda rights without the advice of a trusted adult. If a young child
did "waive" his rights in the absence of such an adult, the state
could still introduce his confession if it could prove that he had in
fact "knowingly and intelligently" waived his rights. Older children
might be presumed capable but would still be entitled to have their
confessions suppressed if they could prove that they had not competently waived their rights. An obvious problem with this proposal
is that it gives police no clear guidelines to follow in interrogating
juveniles and does not tell them how to proceed when they want to
question a young child.' 5 The proposal also places a heavy burden
on reviewing courts to make difficult decisions and still does not
fully protect a juvenile who is incapable of making a sound waiver
decision.
These considerations have led several states-by statute, rule,' 55 or
153. Empirical research could be done to establish the age at which most children possess
the necessary capacity. Virtually no appellate court that has considered the issue has held that a
child is per se incapable of waiving his Miranda rights. See, e.g., Mosley v. State, 246 Ark.
358, 438 S.W.2d 311 (1968); State v. Jackson, 118 Ariz. 270, 576 P.2d 129 (1978); People v.
Lara, 67 Cal. 2d 365, 432 P.2d 202, 62 Cal. Rptr. 586 (1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 945 (1968);
In re J.F.T., 320 A.2d 322 (D.C. 1974); Doerr v. State, 348 So. 2d 938 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1977); Riley v. State, 237 Ga. 124, 226 S.E.2d 922 (1976); State v. Dillon, 93 Idaho 698, 471
P.2d 553 (1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 942 (1971); People v. Pierre, 114 I11.App. 2d 283, 252
N.E.2d 706 (1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 854 (1970); State v. Hinkle, 206 Kan. 472, 479 P.2d
841 (1971); In re Appeal No. 245 (75), 29 Md. App. 131, 349 A.2d 434 (Ct. Spec. App. 1975);
Commonwealth v. Cain, 361 Mass. 224, 279 N.E.2d 706 (1972); State v. Sinderson, 455
S.W.2d 486 (Mo. 1970); State v. Lytle, 194 Neb. 353, 231 N.W.2d 681 (1975); In re Aaron D.,
30 A.D.2d 183, 290 N.Y.S.2d 935 (1968); State v. Strickland, 532 S.W.2d 912 (Tenn. 1975),
appeal dismissed sub nom. Lovelace v. Tennessee, 425 U.S. 929, cert. denied, 425 U.S. 940,
appealdismissed sub nom. Strickland v. Tennessee, 429 U.S. 805 (1976); Theriault v. State, 66
Wis. 2d 33, 223 N.W.2d 850(1974).
154. Cf. Dunaway v. New York, 99 S. Ct. 2248 (1979), in which the Court refused to adopt
a multi-factor balancing test of "reasonable police conduct under the circumstances" to determine the validity of all seizures of persons that do not amount to technical arrests. "A single,
familiar standard is essential to guide police officers, who have only limited time and expertise
to reflect on and balance the social and individual interests involved in the specific circumstances they confront." 99 S. Ct. at 2257.
155. See, e.j., Colorado-Colo. Rev. Stat. § 19-2-102(3)(c)(I) (1973) (waiver invalid unless
adult present and advised of child's rights); Connecticut-Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46b-137(a)
(West Supp. 1979) (statement inadmissible unless child and parent advised of Miranda rights);
Indiana-Ind. Code. Ann. §§ 31-6-7-3(a)(1), (2) (Burns Supp. 1979) (child's counsel may
waive rights, or child's custodian or guardian may if child joins; in addition, waiver must be
knowing and voluntary); Iowa-Iowa Code Ann. §§ 232.11(l)(a)(2) and 232.47(6) (West
Supp. 1979) (no waiver of right to counsel during custodial interrogation without written consent of parent, guardian or custodian, but confession admissible if child voluntarily waived
right to remain silent, waiver to be determined from circumstances, including opportunity to
consult with parents); Maine-Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 15, § 3204 (1979) (confession inadmissible
unless parent present at interrogation, advised of child's rights, and child and parent voluntarily waived rights; parent not required if counsel present or if child emancipated);
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court decision'6 -and the drafters of every major set of juvenile
court standards published in the last decade' 57 to reject the totality of
Minnesota-Minn. Juv. Ct. R. 2-2 (West 1971) (child not to be interrogated unless parent present and advised of rights) and 1-5 (waiver of rights before a court-if child less than 14,
parents waive; if older than 14, parent and child waive); but see State v. Hogan, 297 Minn. 430,
212 N.W.2d 664 (1973) (in counties where Rule 2-2 not effective, validity of waiver determined
by totality of circumstances); Montana-Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 41-5-303(2) (1979) (parents
only may waive rights of a child younger than 12; parents and child or attorney and child must
concur in waiver if child is older than 12); New Mexico-N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32-1-27 (1978)
(child not to be questioned except in presence of parent, guardian, custodian or counsel except
to determine identity) and N.M. Child. Ct. R. 24(b); Oklahoma-Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 10,
§ 1109(a) (West Supp. 1979) (confession inadmissible unless given in presence of parents,
guardian or custodian advised of child's rights, or attorney); Texas-Tex. Fam. Code Ann. tit.
3, § 51.09(a),(b) (Vernon Supp. 1980) (child may waive right to remain silent only if attorney
concurs in waiver or if, prior to questioning, child is taken before a magistrate who advises him
of his rights and assures himself that child's waiver is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary);
Washington-Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 13.40.140(10) (Supp. 1978) (only parents may waive
rights of a child less than 12 years old, test for older children seems to be totality of circumstances); see also State v. Prater, 77 Wash. 2d 526, 463 P.2d 640 (1970); West
Virginia-W. Va. Code § 49-5-1(d) (Supp. 1978) (confession of child less than 16 made
without counsel inadmissible unless res gestae statement).
156. See State ex rel. Dino, 359 So. 2d 586 (La.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1047 (1978); Commonwealth v. Smith. 472 Pa. 492, 372 A.2d 797 (1977). Cf. Lewis v. State, 259 Ind. 431, 288
N.E.2d 138 (1972) (safeguards are now provided by statute in Ind. Code Ann. § 31-6-7-3(1),(2)
(Burns Supp. 1979)).
157. See the following recommendations of the IJA-ABA Juvenile Justice Standards Project:
I. Standards Relating to Interim Status, Std 5.3(c) (Tent. Draft 1977):
Presence of attorney. The right to have an attorney present should be subject
to knowing, intelligent waiver by the juvenile following consultation with
counsel. If the police question any arrested juvenile concerning an alleged offense in the absence of an attorney for the juvenile, no information obtained
thereby or as a result of the questioning should be admissible in any proceeding.
2. Standards Relating to Pretrial Court Proceedings, Std 5. 1(c) (Tent. Draft
1977):
Unless advised by counsel, the statements of a juvenile or other information
or evidence derived directly or indirectly from such statements made while in
custody to police or law enforcement officers, or made to the prosecutor, intake officer, or social service worker during the process of the case, including
statements made during intake, a predisposition study, or consent decree,
should not be admissible in evidence prior to a determination of the petition's
allegations in a delinquency case, or prior to conviction in a criminal proceeding.
3. Standards Relating to Police Handling of Juvenile Problems, Std 3.2 (Tent.
Draft 1977):
Police investigation into criminal matters should be similar whether the
suspect is an adult or a juvenile. Juveniles, therefore, should receive at least
the same safeguards available to adults in the criminal justice system. ...
For some investigative procedures, greater constitutional safeguards are
needed because of the vulnerability of juveniles. Juveniles should not be permitted to waive constitutional rights on their own.
The commentary to this section provides that Miranda warnings must be given to both the
juvenile and his parent or guardian and that following arrest a juvenile may be questioned only
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circumstances test for judging the validity of a juvenile's waiver of
his Miranda rights. Instead, in one form or another, they require
that the child's parent or an attorney participate in a child's'" decision to waive his rights. The Louisiana Supreme Court in State in
Interest of DinoI explained its rejection of the totality rule in favor
of a parental presence rule in the following way:
[Tihe rights which a juvenile may waive before interrogation are
so fundamental to our system of constitutional rule and the
expedient of requiring the advice of a parent, counsel or advisor
so relatively simple and well established as a safeguard against a
juvenile's improvident judicial acts, that we should not pause to
inquire in individual cases whether the juvenile could, on his
own, understand and effectively exercise his rights. Assessments
of how the "totality of the circumstances" affected a juvenile in
a particular case can never be more than speculation. Furthermore, whatever the background of the juvenile interrogated,
assistance of an adult acting in his interest is indispensable to
overcome the pressures of the interrogation and to insure that
the juvenile knows he is free to exercise his rights at that point in
time.
Because most juveniles are not mature enough to understand
their rights and are not competent to exercise them, the concepts
of fundamental fairness embodied in the Declaration of Rights
of our constitution require that juveniles not be permitted to
waive constitutional rights on their own. 6
after conferring with counsel. Questioning must take place in counsel's presence unless the
right to counsel has been waived, and waiver is possible only after consultation with counsel
and must take place in his presence.
The National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, Task Force
Report, supra note 4, makes a similar recommendation. Standard 5.8 provides, "When police
are conducting a custodial investigation of an individual who is legally a juvenile, they should
take care not to allow that juvenile to waive the right against self-incrimination without the
advice of counsel." See also HEW, Legislative Guide for Drafting Family and Juvenile Court
Acts, Pub. No. 472, § 26 (1969); Piersma, Model Juvenile Court Act, 20 St. Louis U.L.J. 1,29
(1975).
158. The state statutes set different age criteria for determining whether an individual alone
may waive his rights. Some even set minimum ages below which a parent alone is empowered
to waive the child's rights. See note 155 supra.
159. 359 So. 2d 586 (La.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1047 (1978).
160. Id. at 592, 594. The court's reference to the "Declaration of Rights of our constitution" is to provisions of the Louisiana, rather than the United States, Constitution. However,
the rights relied on are also protected by the Federal Constitution (due process, equality, right
against self-incrimination), and the Louisiana court's interpretation seems not to have been
based on anything unique in the state constitution. By relying on the state rather than the
Federal Constitution, the court avoided the possibility of the Supreme Court reversing its decision. Cf. Fare v. Michael C., 99 S. Ct. at 2567-68 (decided on federal law grounds).
See also Task Force Report, supra note 4, Stds 5.8, 12.3, 14.5, 16.1 notes; IJA-ABA
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A rule requiring that a parent or guardian be present to advise a
child before he waives his Miranda rights is not free from problems, 16 1 and it may mean that fewer children confess to police. These
seem small prices to pay to protect children against unwise decisions
to waive Miranda rights born of their own immaturity.
CONCLUSION
In Parham, Bellotti, and Farethe Court confronted the question
of whether a child alone can make decisions substantially affecting
his life. In the first two cases the Court assessed the validity of
statutes denying a child this right in light of the competing interests
of parent, child, and state. The Court discussed at length the policies
underlying the constitutional rights of parents to direct the upbringing of their children and emphasized that this right protects
children against the consequences of immature and unwise decisions.
The Court in Faredid not address parental rights and showed much
less concern for children who are incapable of making sound judgments.
The contexts in which this issue arose may explain the difference
in the Court's approaches and the results it reached. Delegating
authority to parents to make decisions for their children and refusing to permit children to challenge those decisions in court furthers
societal interests in conserving judicial resources and in having decisions made by persons who are most intimately acquainted with all
Juvenile Justice Standards Project, Standards Relating to Police Handling of Juvenile Problems, supra note 157, Std 3.2 note; IJA-ABA Juvenile Justice Standards Project, Standards
Relating to Pretrial Court Proceedings, supra note 157, Stds 5.1, 6.2, 6.3 notes.
161. For example, if the child's parent is himself intoxicated, he would not be able to advise
the child adequately. See, e.g., People exrel. L.B., 33 Colo. App. 1,513 P.2d 1069 (1973). But
see Little v. State, 261 Ark. 859, 554 S.W.2d 312 (1977) cert. denied, 435 U.S. 957 (1978) (admission by 13-year-old girl admissible because she had conferred with her mother, even though
the mother was emotionally distraught and may have been under the influence of drugs).
In addition, an occasional parent might have a conflict of interest which would motivate him
not to act in the child's best interests. For example, an empirical study of the implementation
of In re Gault in three metropolitan juvenile courts in 1967-1968 showed that in a substantial
number of cases parents' interests conflicted with those of their children. Lefstein, Stapleton,
& Teitelbaum, supra note 152, at 547-49. This potential, however, should not be used to defeat
the right of all children to their parents' guidance, since most will act in good faith. See
Parham,99 S. Ct. at 2504.
Other cases have considered whether the advise of other adults may suffice if a parent is
unavailable. In re S.D.S., 574 P.2d 1077 (Okla. Crim. 1978) (manager of home for dependent
children in which child lives). Held insufficient: People v. Maes, 571 P.2d 305 (Colo. 1977)
(social services worker); State v. Tolliver, 561 S.W.2d 407 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977) (juvenile
officer).
At least one court has held that a child who confessed in response to a question from his
stepfather in the presence of police officers was not subject to custodial interrogation and that
Miranda did not, therefore, protect him. In re C.P.D., 367 A.2d 133 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
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the factors that must be considered.' 62 In Parham the Court found
that the child's right upon which his parents' decision infringed was
not "fundamental" and the possibility that their decision would be
erroneous was not great. It therefore sanctioned state statutes which
permitted parents, with the concurrence of doctors, to institutionalize their children in mental hospitals. In Bellotti, where the
child's right was deemed fundamental and the consequences of the
parents' wrongful decision to refuse to consent to their child's abortion permanent, the Court imposed greater procedural safeguards.
In neither case did the Court find a substantial state interest that
militated against giving parents power to make decisions for their
children.
In Fare, however, state interests in obtaining confessions weighed
heavily against requiring that a child be permitted to consult with an
adult before waiving his Miranda rights. Requiring consultation
would not only have delayed questioning but might well have
resulted in the child's deciding not to speak to police. Protecting
these state interests prevailed over protecting the interests of parent
and child in assuring that the child made a wise choice. Fareis only
the latest of several decisions that protect these state interests at the
expense of an individual's Mirandarights.' 63
Whether a child has the capacity to make wise judgments is a central issue in all three of these cases. In all three the Court discussed
the issue, yet it cited no empirical evidence which might have resolved the question. Instead, the Court presumed answers that
would help it reach the result that it desired in each case.
The question of whether a child should have the legal right to
make decisions for himself arises in many contexts. The resolution
of the problem in one situation should not necessarily determine its
resolution in others because decisions vary in difficulty and importance, and therefore a child's capacity to decide them also varies.
When the question is presented, though, its answer should be determined by assessing the decision's complexity and evidence bearing
on children's capacity to handle decisions of similar difficulty.' 4
162. See Parham, 99 S. Ct. at 2504-05; Teitelbaum & Ellis, supra note 24, at 163.
163. See, e.g., Butler v. North Carolina, 99 S. Ct. 1755 (1979); Oregon v. Mathiason, 429
U.S. 492 (1977); United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564 (1976); Beckwith v. United States,
425 U.S. 341 (1976); Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S.
96 (1975); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
See also Stone, supra note 60.
164. Michael Wald in Children's Rights: A Frameworkfor Analysis, 12 U.C.D.L. Rev. 255,
274-75 (1979), briefly summarizes some empirical research on children's cognitive and
judgmental skills.
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Using the issue of a child's decision-making capacity as a pawn that
can be manipulated achieves results at the expense of the child. Both
his claim to autonomy and to protection because of immaturity give
way to expediency.

